Rich Democracies

Tables

1.1

Affluence and Pluralism Reduce Civil Violence. Authoritarian Regimes at Low-to-Medium Economic Levels Have the Highest Rates of Violence.

1.2

Big Differences Between Two Groups Within One Upper-Middle Class Profession, Lawyers.

2.1

The Interplay of Left and Catholic Party Power, Proportional Representation, and Trade Dependence as Sources of Democratic Corporatism

2.2

Zero-Order Correlations of Trade Dependence and Corporatism

3.1

Participation of Adult Population in Voluntary Associations, Including Churches and Unions (circa 1968) and in Workplace-Based Organizations (circa 1976)

3.2

Funding and Regulation of Broadcast Media, 1990s

4.1

The Coming of Post-Industrial Society? Percentage Distribution of Employment by Relevant Industrial Sector, 1920-1992, 7 countries.

5.1

Social Spending as a Percent of GNP for 19 Rich Democracies, 1950-86

5.2

The Interaction of Democratic Corporatism, Tax Load, Tax Visibility, and Social Spending in 19 Rich Democracies, 1971

5.3

Types of Political Economy and Social Spending as a Percent of GNP, 1950-86

6.1

Cohesive Spending Patterns Are Linked to Catholicism, Corporatism, and an Aged Population. Divisive Spending Patterns Are Linked to Affluence, Leftism, Minority Group Cleavages, Social Mobility, and Much Public Sector Employment (1971 and 1980 data)

6.2

Types of Political Economy, Public Pensions as Share of National Income 1971 and 1995, Pension Generosity 1995 and 1985, and Reliance on Cash Benefits 1987

6.3

Sources of the Big Tradeoff: Corporatism and Catholic Power Foster Heavy Spending on Family Allowances and Pensions. Least-Corporatist Countries Emphasize Higher Education and the Military and Have Larger Civilian Bureaucracies and Greater Intergenerational Mobility. (1971 and 1980 data for 19 countries.)

7.1

The Interaction After World War II of Types of Political Economy, Party Power and Ideology, Female Labor Force Participation, and the Size of the Aged Population as Sources of Family Policy

7.2

Family Allowance Expenditure as a Percent of GNP, 1980, and Family Policy

8.1

Average Monthly Benefit Payments Per Family or Per Recipient for AFDC, Food Stamps, SSI, Medicaid, and the Earned Income Tax Credit, 1970-1995 (in 1995 dollars)

8.2

Maximum AFDC Grant and Eligibility for a Family of Three, 1996, Reductions in Benefits from 1970 to 1996, and Average Grant per Family 1994, by Quintile Averages of State Generosity

8.3

Types of Political Economy and Reliance on Means-Testing

8.4

The Interaction of Types of Political Economy, Social Policies, Poverty and Inequality as they Shape Teenage Birth Rates and Societywide Abortion Rates

9.1

Although There Is Some Correlation Between Social Spending and Government Employees as a Percentage of the Civilian Labor Force in 1980 (r= .34), Three of Seven Big Spenders Have Few Public Employees, While Five of Eight Lean Spenders Have Many Public Employees.

9.2

Rank Orders of Efficiency and Bureaucratic Bloat for 19 Countries, 1966, 1971, and 1974

9.3

Affluence and Decentralization Create a Need for and Political Pressure For Jobs in the Public Sector; More Corporatist Countries Have Fewer Public Employees as a Percentage of the Civilian Labor Force (1966 and 1971). At the Extremes, the Mobility Aspirations of Minority Groups and Left Power Add to Pressures For Public Sector Jobs

9.4

The Interaction of Types of Corporatism, Minority Group Cleavages, Left and Catholic Party Power, and Labor-Intensive Spending as a Source of Public Sector Jobs (1980)

10.1

British Tory Policies and Campaign Rhetoric 1979-1996 Strengthened An Already Large Pro-Welfare State Majority

10.2

Tax Visibility, Tax Load, and Tax-Welfare Backlash in 19 Rich Democracies

10.3

Left Party Power 1919-1976 Fosters Visible Taxes in 1965-71 and Thereby Increases Tax-Welfare Backlash. Corporatism Has No Independent Effect. Catholic Power Combined with Weak Left Power and Low Tax Visibility Dampens Backlash

10.4

Types of Political Economy as a Source of Backlash: Corporatist Countries, Especially Those With Catholic Power or Left/Catholic Competition, Reduce Inequality and Avoid Over-reliance on Visible Taxes and Stigmatized Benefits, Thereby Reducing Backlash

10.5

Industrialization as a Source of Tax-Welfare Backlash: the Interaction of Affluence, Minority Group Cleavages, Mobility and Meritocracy

12.1

Corporatism, Welfare Effort, and Economic Performance, 1950-1974

12.2

The Interaction of Types of Political Economy, Welfare Effort, and Economic Performance, 1950 to 1974

12.3

The Arab Oil Shock, Energy Dependence, and Pre- and Post-1974 Economic Performance

12.4

Vulnerability to Energy Shocks, Welfare Effort, and Economic Performance Since 1980

12.5

The Interaction of Political Economy, Vulnerability to Energy Shocks, Welfare Effort, and Economic Performance, 1950-1989

12.6

Economic Performance, 1985-89 and 1990-92

12.7

Best Regressions of Economic Performance on Strikes, Capital Investment, Social Spending and Type of Political Economy

12.8

Research and Development Effort and Economic Performance, 1980s

12.9

Comparing Japanese and American Schools

12.10

Types of Political Economy, Lawyers 1982, Law School Graduate Growth Rate 1970-79, and Economic Performance 1974-89

12.11

Typical Regressions of Economic Performance, External Shock Measures, Strikes, and Capital Investment

12.12

Regressions Testing Economic Effects of Property Taxes vs. Strikes and Capital Investment

12.13

Property Taxes as a Percent of GDP, 1965-72, 1973-77, 1978-82, and 1983-87, by Party Power 1919-76, and Types of Political Economy

12.14

Types of Political Economy, Recent Growth in Labor Productivity and Real Compensation, and Household Income Inequality

13.1

Correlations of Job Creation by Three Measures of Economic Performance and the Economic Performance Index

13.2

Job Creation and Family Policy Among the Seven Countries with the Highest Divorce Rates

13.3

The Best Regressions of Job Creation on Independent Variables for Four Periods Since 1968, 18 Rich Democracies

14.1

Countries with Very Low Minority-Group Cleavages Tend to Have Below Average Homicide Rates But Four Countries with Strong Cleavages Also Have Low Homicide Rates

14.2

Means of Mayhem Variables and the Index, 1970-1988

14.3

Mayhem Index for 1970, 1980, and 1988, by Types of Corporatism

14.4

Percentage Share of Household Income by Percentile Group of Households (circa early 1980s), Social Security Spending, and Mayhem 1988

14.5

The Interaction of Industrialization and Types of Political Economy as Sources of Mayhem

15.1

Corporatist Democracies Are Most Effective in Reducing Air Pollution 1975-Late 1980s

15.2

Work Injury Expenditures and Deaths from Industrial Accidents for Three Countries

15.3

Disability Recipients per 1000 Active Labor Force Participants by Age and Older Male Labor Force Participation Rates

15.4

Public Expenditure on Labor Market Measures and on Cash Benefits as a Percentage of GDP 1991

15.5

Smoking Prevalence and Reduction of Smoking Among Men and Women Age 15 and Over in 13 Countries, 1980-1990

15.6

Reliance on Tobacco Taxes 1980, Tobacco Tax Increases 1985-90, and Smoking Reduction 1980-90

15.7

Cigarette Taxes and Prices in 1986 and Smoking Reduction 1980-1990 in Five Countries

16.3

Types of Political Economy, Public Share of Total Health Spending, and Real Health

16.1

Density of Physicians (circa 1984) and Real Health

16.2

Density of Nurses and Midwives and Real Health (circa 1980)

16.4

The Interaction of Government Health and Education Spending per Capita (1975 and 1980), Corporatism, and Affluence Fosters Good Health Performance. Public Spending and Affluence Each Enhance Health Performance. Corporatism Alone Has Little Effect.

17.1

Migration Rates 1900 to 1980 in Four European Countries

17.2

Immigration as a Percentage of Population 1901-1988 for Three Destination Leaders

17.3

Gross Number of Immigrants (000s) for Three Destination Leaders 1901 to 1988 by Ten-Year Periods

17.4

Measures of Central Bank Autonomy Before 1990

17.5

Central Bank Autonomy (CBA) and Economic Performance by Periods, 1965-89