Margaret Levi's wide-ranging theoretical and historical study demonstrates the importance of political relative to economic factors in accounting for revenue production policies.
Of Rule and Revenue
About the Book
Reviews
"A marvelous read, full of interesting lore and powerful ideas. . . . Levi has pushed the historical study of resources mobilization to a new height."—Aaron Wildavsky, University of California, Berkeley"A magnificent book, one of the best blends of rational choice theory and historical analysis I've seen. . . . [Levi's] resolute focus throughout on rulers' efforts to balance extraction of revenues against the compliance of their polities organizes this vast collection of material into a tight, compelling account."—Russell Hardin, University of Chicago
"Margaret Levi convincingly integrates institutional analysis and rational choice theory to provide powerful accounts of what state rulers do. This is an important book, certain to generate broad interest and debate."—Theda Skocpol, Harvard University
"I think the book will have a major impact. It positions itself in the macro-level literature and looks at states and the evolution of political forms. But it does so while championing the use of micro-level tools of reasoning and models derived from rational choice."—Robert H. Bates, Duke University
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
1. Introduction
2. The Theory of Predatory Rule
Appendix to Chapter 2: Excursus on the Acquisition of Rule
3. Creating Compliance
4. Revenue Production in Republican Rome
5. France and England in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance
6. Introduction of the Income Tax in Eighteenth-Century Britain
7. Compliance with the Commonwealth Income Tax in Australia
8. Conclusion
Appendix: Bringing People Back into the State: A Bibliographical Essay
Bibliography
Index