Shoveling Fuel for a Runaway Train

Errant Economists, Shameful Spenders, and a Plan to Stop them All

Brian Czech

Chapter 6

The Steady State Revolution: Precepts and Terminology

An old adage states that democracy is the recurrent suspicion that more than half of the people are right more than half of the time. We live in the world's model democracy--a fact for which to be supremely grateful--and for many of us, majority rule is indeed synonymous with democracy. However, majority rule has long been recognized by philosophers and historians as a dangerous principle that threatens the bigger picture of democracy, including equality, freedom of information, and public participation. This threat is called the tyranny of the majority. When misled, ignorant, or frenzied, the masses can wreak havoc. And yet, would we rather have a king, a dictator, or an aristocracy? The authors of the Constitution did the best that could be done by institutionalizing a system of checks and balances and the principle of representation. The Senate, for example, with its six-year terms, is supposed to have a cool head partially for the purposes of resisting short-term, poorly thought-out frenzies of public opinion.

But even the Constitution's elaborate system of governance can't beat entropy. Nothing is free, and a democracy is ultimately dependent on an intelligent, caring, and participating majority for its success. Problems are solved only when such a majority develops a perspective conducive to the solution. Usually the perspective covers the problematic institution itself, and the primary institutional actors. For example, when the majority of Americans perceived slavery as an unjust institution, and perceived slaveowners as the unjust practitioners thereof, slavery was abolished. Some slaveowners resisted, but they eventually petered out because they were ostracized. Even prior to abolishment, as the public's opinion of slaveowning turned negative, the injustices of slavery were lessened because the behavior of slaveowners changed with the norms. The problem of child labor was solved in a similar manner. Advanced, long-enduring institutions have been uprooted in relatively short order when they and their perpetrators became reprehensible to the majority.

Since the founding of the nation, the American majority has held economic growth in high esteem, and the majority has not been failed by democracy. The economy went through a start-up stage and then took off in the rocket's red glare. It grew up to be big and strong; by 1913 it was the most productive in the world--in 1922 alone gross national product rose 18 percent--by 1989 its volume was 450 times that of the 1820 version. It grew not only in aggregate but in per capita terms; by 1900 the average income was about three times its 1800 counterpart, and by 1990 the average American's consumption expenditure was about four times the 1900 level (Madrick 1995). But somewhere along the line a threshold was crossed. Thereafter, Americans didn't become any happier with all the extra consumption. The transition appears to have taken place somewhere between 1955 and 1980 (Schor 1991, Frank 1999).

Now the economy bloats at a rate of about 2.5 percent per year-5 percent in particularly threatening years. If it is not to jeopardize the lives of the grandkids, its growth must taper off at or below carrying capacity in K-selected fashion (see chapter 5). This will require nothing less than a revolution, a social revolution to match the academic revolution of ecological economics. The total revolutionary package may be called the steady state revolution.

The steady state revolution will be nothing like, for example, a Marxist revolution. Marx was convinced on theoretical grounds that capitalism was doomed, that socialism was the next stage, and that the economic evolution of humans would culminate in communism. Personally, he was all for such a development. Politically, therefore, he called upon the working masses to revolt. The bourgeoisie would not relinquish its undeserved wealth without a fight; might as well fight it out right away and shorten the term of oppression.

The call for the steady state revolution bears no resemblance to Marx's, in the sense that its aim is not communism or any other replacement of a prudently managed capitalist democracy. And there is no call here for a forcible overthrow of anything. Americans black and white have proven a great deal about the effectiveness of nonviolent revolution. So have others all over the world. As Brown (1995:119) pointed out in Models in Political Economy, "Most revolutionary social changes have involved very little violence."

On the other hand, the call for a steady state economy is far more urgent than Marx's. Unlike his evolutionary perspective of communism, there is no reason to believe that a steady state economy is preordained. And this is worrisome, because as Brown (1995:119) also noted, "It is the social breakdown that follows a failure to change that engenders violence." Americans are exhibiting some highly r-selective traits, portending a failure to change that could culminate in violence. Cornell professor Robert Frank (1999) pointed out that luxury spending in the United States is growing more than four times as rapidly as spending overall. Luxury autos, mansions and second mansions, vast lots, huge yachts, gawdy home appliances, cosmetic procedures, ultrapremium wines-all are being consumed at unprecedented rates. The ridiculous magazine Cigar Aficionado had more than 400,000 paid subscribers in 1996, and subscriptions were increasing rapidly.

Worst of all, it is not just the super-rich accounting for such waste. For every mansion on a vast lot, there are hundreds or thousands of "McMansions" on large lots. While the super-rich buys a $30 million yacht, the plain-old rich buys the $130,000 "bionic dolphin" (a one-person watercraft). For every million-dollar "Diamond Dream Bra," thousands of hundred-dollar bras are purchased. These incredible figures have been well documented by Frank (1999:37), who sensed a "growing social tolerance of acquisitiveness and greed."

While the super-rich are spending embarrassing amounts, anybody with the means seems to be following suit. In fact, all the way down the line we Americans seem to have a problem. We do it on credit, if necessary. By 1986, total spending in the United States came to 104 percent of GNP. How could that be? We borrowed $157 billion from foreign banks (Hamrin 1988). By 1988, the bunch of us spent $313 billion on leisure travel and over $200 billion on gambling (Paepke 1993). The throwaway nature of our consumerism is legendary; we drink more soda pop than water! A lot of the "consumption" is actually waste; we annually dump the equivalent of more than 21 million shopping bags full of food into landfills. Researchers from the State University of New York at Syracuse calculated that an American born in the 1990's would produce in a lifetime about one million kilograms of atmospheric wastes, ten million kilograms of liquid wastes, and one million kilograms of solid wastes. In addition, an American will consume 700 thousand kilograms of minerals, and 24 billion BTU's of energy, which is equivalent to 4 thousand barrels of oil. In a lifetime, an average American will eat 25 thousand kilograms of major plant foods and 28 thousand kilograms of animal products, provided in part by slaughtering two thousand animals (Hall et al. 1994:509-510).

These physical features are difficult to put into perspective, but there are telling psychological signs as well. For example, the fastest growing spectator sport in America is stock car racing; over 150 million Americans tuned in to watch at least one race in 1997. Some stock car races, like the Daytona 500, have attained prime-time TV coverage. What does this tell us about the American conservation ethic? How will the grandkids look back upon this folly? After all, racing amounts to intensive petrol consumption for exceedingly ephemeral gratification.

Perhaps these tendencies are related to the survey mentioned in chapter 1 that found that 63 percent of Americans agreed there were no limits to economic growth. As outlined in part 1, they have learned their neoclassical growth lessons well, either literally in the classroom or vicariously through the evening news.

It is very difficult to consider such aspects of American culture and conclude that we have a sustainable future. If Americans are indeed r-selected, the economy will stop growing all right, but not by reaching a steady plateau upon which to rest. It will stop growing in Malthusian fashion, with blight and despair in the offing as it crumbles amidst a wasted environment. While Marx' theoretical evolution was inexorably toward the good, and could be hastened via revolution, the real-world evolution is clearly toward the bad, and is hastened by the status quo!

In the world's model democracy, the steady state revolution must be a revolution in public opinion, a process by which the virtually ubiquitous cherishing of economic growth is transformed into an equally ubiquitous castigation of economic growth. This type of revolution is more social than political. It will not restructure the political system, but will replace the society of politicians with one of a different mind, with vastly different implications for the traditional beneficiaries of public policy. Majority opinion will be amenable to a steady state economy, and it will have to be sincere, explicit, and long term. Sincere means that people will act upon their convictions. Explicit means that the goal will be expressed in terms that cannot be misinterpreted by politicians who are supposed to represent the people. Long term means for the remainder of American existence, assuming that God declines to rewrite the biophysical laws.

Does the castigation of economic growth make the steady state revolution a moral affair? Only to the extent that the current cherishing of economic growth is a moral affair, and only to the extent that conserving the grandkids' inheritance is considered a moral issue. One could also classify it as an issue of economic sustainability, public health, or intergenerational justice. Each of these are put at risk by economic growth. Those with a vested interest in economic growth will probably build a strawman of the steady state revolution, portraying it as an emotionally driven attempt to enforce one set of morals on the rest of society. Such a portrayal will be a transparent attempt to buy time for economic growth and the attendant profits for some, and its transparency will increase as the economy congests and the environment degrades. In a concurrently increasing fashion, the steady state revolution will be seen by objective observers as a logical attempt to debunk a harmful myth that has been perpetuated by a cadre of professionals who serve (more or less wittingly) powerful economic interests.

Meanwhile, if the grandkids' prospects are an emotional issue for some, they surely cannot help it. Although one may claim on political grounds that such folks are driven by emotions, another may claim on scientific grounds that such emotions comprise an evolved survival instinct (Wilson 1998). The goal of the steady state revolution is to establish a steady state economy for the purpose of providing the grandkids (and their grandkids as well) a well-endowed natural environment conducive to health, happiness, and their own economic opportunities. The motives of such a goal should require little analysis. To the extent that the supporter of this goal may be portrayed as a bleeding heart, the opponent of this goal may be portrayed as a misanthropic deviant.

Although there is no reason to believe that this revolution in public opinion is preordained, there are reasons to be hopeful. Most importantly, people truly care about their grandkids, and even about their grandkids' grandkids. Couple this with our generally increasing aversion to risk, as documented by C. Owen Paepke in The Evolution of Progress, and we have to conclude that our wastefulness is less a matter of greed than ignorance. Our majority, misled by neoclassical economics and its corporate backers, is simply unaware of the magnitude of risks imposed by economic growth upon the grandkids. But the truth can be denied for only so long. The signs of economic growth gone awry are abundant: congestion, endangered species, and water shortages, for starters. All it will take is for more people to interpret such signs as the effect of economic growth, and not of other scapegoat phenomena. Ecological economics will be there to do the interpreting, and common sense will do the rest.

In thinking about a steady state revolution in public opinion, it will be useful to clarify a few terms. Words are incredibly important devices. Not words per se, but the connotations they produce, the baggage they carry, and the actions they invoke. A philosopher once remarked that there is no greater impediment to the advancement of knowledge than the ambiguity of words. Maybe, unless it is the unambiguity of words that are used in the wrong context. Take growth, for instance. Growth is not at all ambiguous. It means to increase, get larger, expand, blossom. It's what babies, puppies, and kittens do. For many people, the fondest memories are of childhood or adolescent growth. Knowledge grows, bank accounts grow, confidence grows. Good things grow, and when they don't grow, it is bad. To not grow generally means to shrink, shrivel, dwindle, wither.

When the term "economic growth" is used, people are predisposed toward a positive reaction. Now this might be a minor point if the term was used as often as "pumpernickel" or "molecular evolution." But the term economic growth is heard virtually every day by those who watch the news or read the newspapers. If you get through a day without hearing it, don't worry, it will catch up to you. Remember the Kemp quote from the 1996 vice presidential debate? That was far from the only mention of economic growth. Twenty-two topics were debated, only three of which pertained directly to the economy. Nevertheless, Kemp interjected calls for faster economic growth in thirteen of the topical categories.

True, there are many among us who have seen the phenomenon of growth run amuck. In individuals, we've seen cancer and obesity. In societies, we've seen fads and fascism. In nature, we've seen invasions and infestations. Still, we generally don't think of such phenomena in terms of growth, even growth gone awry. We think of them as diseases, disasters, or mistakes. Cancer, for example, is not referred to as growth, but simply as cancer. When it happens, it is the withering aftermath that is despised, not the preceding growth.

Furthermore, economic growth is a particular manifestation of growth that we have been conditioned to appreciate, cheer, and serve. After all, economic growth was, during most of its history, a wonderful thing for Americans. Of course, let us not forget the Native Americans, for whom the new American economy was a cultural death knell. But for the new Americans, when carrying capacity was a far-off ceiling, economic growth did mean better food, clothing, housing, and education. Understandably, the term economic growth could for many years engender happy, encouraging thoughts. That much is beyond our control.

Perhaps, then, we should find a replacement phrase with an equally powerful, but negative, connotation. Herman Daly once referred to "economic swelling"; I suspect "bloating" is more conducive to a paradigm shift. Swelling connotes an uncomfortable condition, one that usually goes away on its own, and it creates no real sense of alarm. With bloating, if you don't do something about it, the outcome is positively repugnant. For educated Americans who have come to recognize economic growth as a major problem, step number one in the steady state revolution is simple. Let's stop calling a major problem, perhaps the ultimate problem, something that has such a proud, positive connotation. That just invites the continued pulling of wool over eyes. Let's call it economic bloating.

A bloating economy, as with any economy, consists of households and firms, each of which are comprised of individuals. So an economy consists of individuals, some of whom are more responsible than others for economic bloating. This class of individuals is characterized by excessive consumption. The consumption is usually manifest in personal belongings, like cavernous homes, gas-guzzling cars, and yachts. Family members are responsible for such consumption. The consumption can be corporate too, like palatial headquarters, executive resorts, and private jet fleets. Boards of directors and chief executives are responsible for this type of consumption. Such family and corporate individuals are termed "wealthy," but "wealth" is another word to be wary of. It is often couched in meritorious terms, as in "healthy, wealthy and wise." It is synonymous with "plenty," but while the plentiful object is usually money or valuable goods, one may also have a "wealth of knowledge" or a "wealth of friends." Because wealth, like growth, has such positive connotations, it behooves us to adopt a more representative term for those contributing disproportionately to economic bloating.

The term "bloated class" would be a bit unsophisticated for academics, and might therefore not be taken seriously. "Bourgeoisie" is too cliché and carries the big bag of communism. Perhaps the term "liquidating class" will do. This term has just enough sophistication to sound intellectually legitimate, but not enough to knock it out of American vernacular. Most importantly, it accurately reflects the problematic aspect of economic bloating. While the bourgeoisie was identified with the heartless oppression of the working class, the liquidating class is identified with the wanton destruction of the grandkids' natural environment. The liquidating class liquidates natural capital for the purposes of its own excess.

Of course, everyone liquidates to some extent. But just like the wealthy class was identified for having way more money than the other classes, the liquidating class liquidates way more of the environment. Some people live in mansions and own vacation homes. These folks liquidate via residence. Some drive Cadillacs on weekdays and Ferraris on weekends. These folks liquidate via transportation. Some accumulate expensive household items that sit there and do nothing (like the collector on the news this morning who spent $22,000 on some Mickey Mouse paraphernalia). These folks liquidate by collecting. Some people watch their big screen TVs from their thousand-dollar recliners; they liquidate via luxury. Some wear expensive fur coats and huge diamond rings; they liquidate by adorning themselves. Some live on porterhouse steaks and caviar; they liquidate with their stomachs. Some pay hundreds a month on massages and hairdos; they liquidate by pampering themselves.

Although one must have a large quantity of money or assets to belong to the liquidating class, moneyed folks do not necessarily belong to the liquidating class. Once in awhile someone wins a million-dollar lottery and keeps the same small house, the same small car, and the same blue collar job. The money is saved or dispersed among family members, with large quantities given to charity. Such a person is clearly not a liquidator. The liquidating class is characterized by high levels of wasteful consumption, which amounts to the frivolous liquidation of the natural environment.

As with the term "wealthy class," the relativity of the term "liquidating class" causes some problems. If you're penniless, no one would call you a "liquidator." If you're Microsoft's Bill Gates, who built a $40 million house (complete with video walls and private trout stream), you're a liquidator in everyone's book. Even if you're only like Gates's counterpart at Oracle, Lawrence Ellison (whose Japanese-style daimyo house has a carp pool and a teahouse), you're still an obvious liquidator. The closer you get to this type of consumption, the more likely you are to be classified as a liquidator.

For the purposes of the steady state revolution in public opinion, let us consider the top one percent of people, in terms of personal consumption expenditure, to comprise the liquidating class. (We understand from the start that certain folks in this category are exempt, like devoted philanthropists.) Personal consumption expenditures-not including house purchases-account for almost 70 percent of gross domestic product (Stein and Foss 1995), and the proportion has been steadily rising since 1950. Personal consumption expenditures therefore comprise the primary source of economic bloating, and a source that is clearly amenable to modification via public opinion revolution. I will explain my selection of the one percent criterion, and the ease with which it may be applied, in chapter 7.

Because we have identified a particular class based on its tendency to liquidate exorbitant amounts of natural capital, we need a term that describes the people who conserve natural capital. These are the people whose consumptive behavior is conducive to a steady state economy. Many characteristics of this behavior come to mind: responsible, sustainable, modest, charitable, prudent. Of course, we can get carried away with attribution. Just as liquidators may not be aware of the consequences of their liquidating behavior, wealthy nonliquidators might merely be misers. So it wo uld be misleading to call nonliquidators, for example, the "conscientious class." The term "sustainable class" would certainly be appropriate, because this class, conscientiously or not, offers our grandkids the hope of a sustainable future. But sustainable is a rather passive and dull term.

Perhaps the term "steady state class" will do. It would be identified readily with the class of people whose behavior is conducive to a steady state economy. Members of the steady state class, or "steady staters," would be known for their conservation, thrift, and (at least in conscientious cases) ethics. For the purposes of the steady state revolution in public opinion, let us consider the bottom 80 percent of people, in terms of personal consumption expenditure, to comprise the steady state class. I will explain the selection and application of the 80 percent criterion in chapter 8.

Finally, we need a term for those residing in the intermediate 19 percent of personal consumption expenditures. These folks vary tremendously in their liquidating habits, with a dubious effect on economic bloating. The term "amorphic class," encompassing as it were the "amorphs," will serve to capture the many and malleable consumption patterns displayed therein. Such patterns will be explored in chapter 9.